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1 Introduction 
 
 Over the past two decades, social capital has witnessed an astonishing rise to 
prominence across the social sciences. Although its intellectual life has its origins in 
US traditions, variously (mis-)interpreted,1 of the enormous significance of civil 
society to economic and social functioning, the idea was rapidly and fully adopted and 
promoted by the World Bank in the second half of the 1990s as the “missing link” in 
development.2 In the early years of the new millennium, its most prominent 
proponents at the Bank had already confessed to the weakness of the idea and that it 
had served its purpose, Bebbington et al (2004 and 2006). Nonetheless, in part 
prompted by the World Bank’s support, but also benefiting from a momentum of its 
own, social capital has continued to thrive across the social sciences. In health studies, 
it has gone from strength to strength despite some concerted opposition. 
 
 It would appear, then, that social capital would offer an ideal topic for 
examining the dynamic, quality and impact of World Bank research. Yet, the Deaton 
review of its research over the period 1998 to 2005 scarcely mentions social capital, 
and is peremptorily damning. This might be a consequence of the random choice of 
work to be reviewed, supplemented for review by targeted selections of best practice 
research by the Bank itself but after the decline of social capital. Even so, the failure 
to address social capital is indicative of broader weaknesses of Deaton. These are laid 
out in section 2 in terms of a lack of interdisciplinarity and heterodoxy in perspective 
as well as a failure to address the major issues and concerns around development. 
There is also a failure to go further in exploring the reasons for the divide between 
scholarship and advocacy, and their interaction with policy itself. In this light, the 
(lack of) treatment of social capital in Deaton is critically assessed in Section 3. 
 
 Health enjoys a much more prominent position within Deaton. But, as outlined 
in Section 4, as a specific example of its more general weaknesses, it offers little 
assessment of the major policy positions adopted by the Bank and the scholarship 
underpinning them. In addition, its treatment of health is primarily informed by 
microeconomic principles as opposed to understandings rooted in a more widely cast 
understanding based on health provision and outcomes as being systemic. 
 
 Section 5 offers a wide-ranging critical assessment of social capital and the 
role it has played within the World Bank and more widely. It is suggested that it 
represents the degradation of social theory and that its adoption and promulgation by 
the Bank represents a particular relationship between scholarship, rhetoric and policy 
(with little impact upon the latter despite exaggerated claims). 
 
 Whatever the life of social capital at the World Bank, it has become 
increasingly prolific in study of the social determinants of health, SDH. As revealed 
in section 6, as with other applications of social capital across the social sciences, it 
has become a universal analytical fix, but one that tends to leave aside issues of class, 
power, conflict, race and gender, although these are increasingly being brought back 
in as a corrective. What also stands out in the SDH literature, though, is the strength 
of voiced opposition to social capital, a result of its relative radical origins and more 
careful attention to empirical evidence - in constructing measures, identifying 
mechanisms, and distinguishing correlation from causation. 
 
 The final section puts forward the idea that health provision and outcomes 
should be understood within a systemic approach in which the material social 
relations, agencies and processes involved are contextually and culturally situated. On 
this basis, it is arguable that “social capital” would have no role to play, and both 
Deaton and World Bank scholarship would have the potential to be better informed by 
best practice insights from across the social sciences. 
 
2 Deaton in Perspective 
 
From the perspective of critical scholars, one striking feature of the Deaton 
Report(s) is not only its emphasis on the extent of poor scholarship but also the use of 
such scholarship for purposes of “advocacy” and worse. The breadth and depth of this 
problem is a theme running throughout the Report(s). Thus, “the panel has substantial 
criticisms of the way that this research was used to proselytize on behalf of Bank 
policy, often without expressing appropriate scepticism. Internal research that was 
favorable to Bank positions was given greater prominence, and unfavorable research 
ignored … balance was lost in favor of advocacy … there was a serious failure of the 
checks and balances that should separate advocacy and research”, p. 6.3 These themes 
around advocacy, proselytising and balance recur. For, “putting too much weight on 
preliminary or flawed work could [why not “does”?] expose the Bank to charges that 
its research is tailored or selected to support its predetermined positions, and the panel 
believes that, in some cases, the Bank proselytized selected new work in major policy 
speeches and publications, without appropriate caveats on its reliability … this 
happened with some of the Bank’s work on aid effectiveness”, p. 38.4  
 
For the latter, in particular, “we see a serious failure in the checks and 
balances within the system that has led the Bank to repeatedly trumpet these early 
empirical results without recognizing their fragile and tentative nature … this line of 
research appears to have such deep flaws that, at present, the results cannot be 
regarded as remotely reliable … There is a deeper problem here than simply a wrong 
assessment of provocative new research results. The problem is that in major policy 
speeches and publications, it proselytized the new work without appropriate caveats 
on its reliability … the Bank seriously over-reached in prematurely putting its 
globalization, aid and poverty publications on a pedestal. Nor has it corrected itself to 
this day”, p. 53. Further, “it should have been clear from the outset that the evidence 
could not bear the weight that was placed by it in the argument about, and justification 
for, Bank policy”, p. 54. Indeed, its results would “require an unusually generous 
suspension of disbelief”, p. 55. 
 
More generally, “One criticism that was made repeatedly [by assessors] is that 
research tended to jump to policy conclusions that were not well-supported by the 
evidence”, p. 40. And, of course, “it is very difficult to be fully objective about the 
results of your pet project … There is much selection of evidence, with obscure, 
sometimes unpublished, studies with the ‘right’ message given prominence over 
better and better-known studies that come to the ‘wrong’ conclusion”, p. 84. Indeed, 
this is all so bad that, “The panel is particularly concerned with finding a way to fund 
Bank research that protects its independence, and guarantees that Bank research does 
not degenerate into pure advocacy of the type that has become all too prevalent in the 
global poverty debate”, p. 149.5 In view of the above, we are ultimately offered what 
might be thought to be the epitome of understatement, “Nevertheless, over the review 
period, we are concerned that the independence of Bank research may have frayed at 
the edges”, emphasis added, p. 156. On the contrary, the lack of independence seems 
to go to the very heart of Bank research on the evidence of the Report(s), and this 
heart disease is far from new with no discussion offered on whether it has in fact 
worsened and only at the margins. During the period of the Washington Consensus, 
these problems may well have been much worse with a lesser balance of higher 
quality research by whatever standards. Certainly, this would have been the 
judgement of the Chief Economist, Joe Stiglitz, advocate if not proselytiser of the post 
Washington Consensus, and in post at the beginning of the period covered by Deaton. 
 
In light of these, and other, problems, the Deaton Report seeks to put much of 
this right through a number of recommendations, most of which do not go far beyond 
recognising the nature of the problems in more detail (as opposed to identifying their 
causes and corresponding remedies). Thus, it is acknowledged that, “Alongside the 
excellent work, there is a great deal of research that is undistinguished and not well-
directed either to academic or policy concerns”, p. 38. So, let’s find incentives and 
systems that render this otherwise without acknowledging that the dull weight of such 
mundane research serves as a highly functional defence against engaging better 
scholars, and criticism, from outside the Bank let alone within. Similarly, the random 
quality of consultants, and the appalling absence of “client” country participation in 
research is observed but not properly explained, “Some of the very best work and 
some of the very worst work that we reviewed were written jointly with outside 
consultants. At the same time, there is remarkably little work co-authored by non-
Bank researchers from developing countries”, p. 39. Why is this so, given the role of 
the putative knowledge bank in research and training? Similarly, why is there so little 
external critical engagement, debate and self-reflection, “Evaluators also noted that a 
high proportion of the citations in this group of [less distinguished] papers are to other 
Bank papers, many of them unpublished. In some cases, where groups are almost 
entirely inward looking, the degree of self-reference rises almost to the level of 
parody”, p. 73. In addition, the Report also reproduces the comment from a Bank 
researcher: 
 
Research … is essentially a form of rhetoric. It is often not about doing 
research to discover new knowledge but to justify some previously determined 
policy. It is not unusual to be told that “we should do an evaluation to prove 
that X program works,” for instance. Or “we have to run some regressions to 
show that Y agenda matters for growth otherwise we will not have Bank buy-
in.” Peer reviewing is often fixed by appointing cronies as reviewers who are 
not in a position to make critical comments. 
 
Further, one researcher comments, “There was an enormous amount of interference 
by the PR people, especially after Wolfensohn became president; research was not 
supposed to offend NGOs, nor to provide them with material they could use to 
criticize the Bank”, p. 127. And, for another, “the WDRs (and PRRs) were a prime 
example of research where the conclusions are ‘either predetermined or negotiated in 
advance’ … This stuff is largely worthless”, p. 129. This all speaks volumes about the 
institutional culture in which the Bank undertakes its research, and presumes that both 
institution and culture would need to be reformed. 
 
 But my intention is not to assess the recommendations of the Report as such, 
nor whether they may be clipped and tailored to what might be thought to be 
acceptable in practice to those who might make changes. Rather, I wish to highlight 
how remarkably limited is the Report’s understanding of the relationship between 
scholarship, advocacy/proselytising/rhetoric/ ideology, and policy. In earlier work, 
especially on the shift between Washington and post Washington Consensus, I have 
emphasised: how these three elements are not necessarily mutually consistent with 
one another; but nor are they independent of one another; and they have a shifting 
relationship between one another over time and place and across issues.6 
Significantly, the Deaton Report more or less neglects policy (of the Bank) in practice 
and sees the relationship between scholarship and advocacy as a simple dualism of 
making them more compatible with one another, inevitably closing the gap towards 
scholarship and against advocacy. This is unfortunate especially as the Report 
observes, in a rare example of insight on theses issues, that the Bank is in a position to 
address “the ‘big’ questions, such issues as how to reduce poverty, how to help Africa 
grow faster, how to balance social sectors like health and education with more 
narrowly economic investments, or whether and under what circumstances aid 
works”. Not surprisingly, then, “Bank researchers almost certainly have more 
influence on Bank operations indirectly, through their influence on the broad 
community, as directly, through their advice on particular programs and projects”, p. 
14. 
 
As a result of failing to pursue this further, Deaton is seriously deficient in its 
framework of analysis for two major reasons. First is the failure to see the strained 
relationship between scholarship and advocacy (and policy) as longstanding (if not 
unchanging in substance), endemic, institutionalised and functional for the discretion 
and control of the Bank in the development arena. Second, in a parody of its own 
critique of the Bank’s introspection, is the total absence of any consideration of the 
voluminous critical literature that already exists on these aspects of the Bank’s 
performance. Every critic of the Bank, and most of its practitioners and supporters, 
know that it seeks to suppress criticism and, where it fails, it certainly does not engage 
with it other than to seek to manage it.7 A striking example is provided by Broad’s 
(2006) recent, closely researched account of World Bank “paradigm maintenance”, 
not only unremarked by Deaton but also attempted to be discredited by the World 
Bank clandestinely and, when unsuccessful, failing to respond in print, as revealed in 
the commentary by Susan George at 
http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?&act_id=16211, with details of the shenanigans 
involved. George suggests that “Broad, with little or no access to the material this 
[Deaton] commission could consult arrived, earlier and single-handed, at the same 
conclusion”. In a later piece, Broad (2007, p. 707) seems to agree in that, “The 
[Deaton] ‘audit’ review reached conclusions that were shockingly similar to mine”. 
This is, however, both too modest and too uncritical of Deaton. For Broad carefully 
delineates six mechanisms by which, most important of all, the Bank sustains its 
“paradigm” – through hiring, promotion, selective enforcement of rules for 
publication, discouraging dissent, selective presentation and external projection.  
 
In this light, Deaton has effectively reinvented the wheel in pointing to the 
deep deficiencies in World Bank research, although it has squared off the wheel in not 
engaging with earlier, fuller and more wide-ranging accounts and in not identifying in 
what direction the putative wheel is rolling. Despite its most welcome, wide-ranging, 
and relatively rare, assessment from its own perspective (see next), it may well have 
confined itself to yet another telling but archived critique of Bank output and process. 
It is observed that, p. 8: 
 
Bank research has not been monitored and evaluated as often as is desirable. 
The fact that our evaluation is the first in seven years is not unrelated to some 
of the problems we have found. More regular evaluations would permit early 
termination of bad projects, and would help limit the long tail of 
undistinguished work. 
 
Yet, there is no assessment of how evaluations, within the Bank or otherwise, are 
responded to, if at all, and this is certainly more important than a greater frequency of, 
ignored, evaluations.  
 
These failings are hardly surprising in view of other critical weaknesses of the 
Deaton process. First, the analytical framework is adopted exclusively from within 
mainstream economics and, in general, at the forefront of the discipline, at least in 
some respects, as it is currently. This involves a general predisposition towards both 
mathematical models as theory and methodological individualism. But there is a 
departure from exclusive reliance upon the idea that markets work perfectly, and there 
is also inclusion of non-market factors. Particular emphasis is based upon 
econometrics, as evidence-based research for the purposes of policymaking.8 In short, 
there is a close affinity between the stance adopted and “freakonomics”: the idea that 
economists can address anything from close examination of the statistical evidence 
through the analytical lens of individual pursuit of self-interest plus other, relatively 
arbitrarily added, factors.9  
 
 The Deaton approach is certainly more than sufficient to address World Bank 
research on its own terms and from the perspective of mainstream economics, and to 
give it a considerable going over. But it is sorely deficient for assessing the 
scholarship, advocacy and policy attached to development. In particular, and in brief, 
it offers no notion of development itself, at most picking off topics from development 
such as poverty and aid; it is extremely narrow in its economic theory; and it is totally 
lacking in interdisciplinarity. For the latter, in particular, and most significant and 
ironic for the story of social capital at the Bank, we have a critique of Deaton by Rao 
and Woolcock (2007a and b) for failing to have engaged any non-economists amongst 
the assessors.10 They point to the disciplinary monopoly of economics in the Bank’s 
research, and in Deaton’s assessment, at the expense of other disciplines – although 
they overlook that this monopoly holds equally within the economics as well, 
excluding alternatives that are open to interdisciplinarity other than on the terms of 
economics imperialism (adding non-economic variables to the economic whether as 
freakonomics or otherwise), Fine and Milonakis (2008). Thus, when the Report 
suggests, “Currently, there is very little frontline academic work being done by 
economists in such important areas as urban economics, transportation, climate 
change, and infrastructure”, emphasis added, p. 15, the implication is that no 
economic analysis is being done despite these topics being of central importance to 
other disciplines as well, including specialised journals for the purpose.11 
 
Significantly, then, the criterion that comes to the fore in assessing the quality 
of World Bank research is by refereeing for an economics journal. There is a bias 
towards “the three top general interest journals”, such as the American Economic 
Review, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics, as well 
as Econometrica and Journal of Finance, p. 37. These are notable for their narrowness 
in theory and method and, of necessity, not being attuned to development. There is 
also a tension in accepting this criterion of top journals and, yet, remaining critical of 
its consequences. For, “In spite of having been published in the American Economic 
Review, the Burnside and Dollar paper is unconvincing”, p. 54. And, “the Bank did 
not appear to recognize the weakness of this evidence. Not only did it form the basis 
for the PRR Assessing Aid, but its results were built upon in a series of papers by 
Collier and Dollar that were published between 2001 and 2004 in the Economic 
Journal, in the European Economic Review, and in World Development”, p. 55. The 
high quality of Chief Economists is also noted although these have been more notable 
for their contributions to mathematical economics than to development. And the 
reference to one as Nobel Laureate is astonishing given this was received immediately 
after being “sacked” by the Bank, p. 11.  
 
On the other hand, despite the desire for scholarly standards, reference is made 
to the importance of the WDRs because the one for 1993 offered Bill Gates the 
moment of truth to be involved in supporting health initiatives in developing 
countries, pp. 77 and 102.12 Insofar as the WDR plays such a mobilising role, it is 
perceived to render it bland, “they often seek to minimize conflict and to emphasize 
‘win-win’ situations instead of trade-offs. They often lack sharpness and focus, and 
are sometimes incoherent, especially when it proves impossible to reconcile the views 
of the various commentators and authors”, p. 8.13 This is, however, to misread the role 
of the WDRs whose compromises at the expense of trade-offs remain confined to a 
very narrow range of opinion, with all heterodox and critical scholarship excluded if 
not precluded. Indeed, the trade-offs, including the role of wide consultation, is less 
one of satisfying all comers as of managing and marginalising dissent.  
 
In addition, Deaton takes the apparently reasonable position in principle, 
alongside a number of the assessors, that World Bank research has neither to be 
correct nor uncontroversial to be useful, p. 78: 
 
The most effective of the WDRs change the debate about development. To do 
this, they do not necessarily have to be correct, nor to be widely academically 
accepted, either at the time of writing or later. 
 
But, in practice, the situation is far from satisfactory precisely because of the heavy 
hand of advocacy and policy over scholarship, as once again has so frequently been 
emphasised by critics of the Bank, especially under the Washington Consensus. For, 
in changing the debate about development, the Bank has generally set a limited 
agenda (such as market versus the state), within narrow limits in precluding and 
failing to engage with many alternatives, and deployed its resources and influence to 
manage debate, the example of social capital being exemplary, see below. Indeed, 
when the Bank purportedly shifts debate, as in its discussion of the East Asian 
Miracle for example, it often sees itself as raising a new issue and being original 
when, in effect, what is happening is to wipe the slate clean of what is generally more 
radical and insightful scholarship and proceed as if it never existed. In short, paradigm 
and issue shift at the Bank is not the consequence of scholarship. On the contrary, in 
general, it is shifts in scholarship that are the servant of other goals and pressures.14 
 
Equally evident of lack of sufficient reflection on the process and impact of 
scholarship, but extraordinarily striking, is the absence of one particular criterion for 
assessing research - the failure to judge the quality of World Bank research from any 
sort of perspective on the major issues of concern themselves. To my astonishment, I 
found that there is little to learn from the Reports on development itself or the 
development literature, quite apart from the debates that these have inspired. How is it 
possible that a review of World Bank research could offer so little of substance rather 
than a judgement of quality detached from substance? The answer is in the pre-
occupation with technique (if complemented by a wish for policy relevance). 
Significantly, the term “Washington Consensus” only appears once throughout the 
Reports, and post Washington Consensus not at all. But, surely the dominance of 
World Bank research by the Washington Consensus, and its displacement just as the 
research period covered by Deaton is beginning, is key to any assessment of research 
activity and its reform. To spell it out, was the Washington Consensus justified? If 
not, has its influence on research been remedied by the post Washington Consensus? 
Questions such as these are imperative to any assessment of the nature, dynamic and 
impact of World Bank research, unless reduced to fence-sitting on technique.  
 
And lest this be thought to be unduly polemical in focusing on controversy 
over shifting “consensus”, almost unbelievably, the Deaton Reports make no 
reference whatsoever to PRSPs, in acronym or otherwise. The “Millennium 
Development Goals” (plus MDG) appears only three times in the Deaton Report and 
otherwise only four times across two of the other Reports. And the same neglect 
applies to the Comprehensive Development Framework. Like the Washington 
Consensus that preceded it, it too only warrants a single citation throughout the 
Reports, p. 81.  
 
Issues are seen through the lens of current Bank policies, even when not 
obviously appropriate. The WDR on Entering the 21st Century is burdened 
with having to mount a sustained defense of the Comprehensive Development 
Strategy. 
 
So, whilst policy relevance is offered by the Deaton Report as a criterion for judging 
research, it fails to mention either the Bank’s organising conceptual framework nor its 
policy framework under Wolfensohn other than in passing and in scurrilous dismissal 
for the latter.  
 
3 Deaton and Social Capital 
 
Interestingly, the reference to the Comprehensive Development Framework is 
immediately followed by the only mention of social capital in the Deaton Report 
itself: 
 There is much political correctness including mindless cheerleading for 
cultural touchstones such as women, trees, and social capital, as in “women 
are an important engine of growth”. 
 
Leaving aside what this does for women and trees, it sets not so much the dismissive 
tone for, as the absence of, social capital within the Deaton Reports. This is a serious 
deficiency given the high profile played by social capital in the World Bank’s 
research over the period covered by Deaton, and the lessons that might be learnt from 
it whether in terms of cultural touchstones, political correctness, mindless 
cheerleading or otherwise. 
 
 In the evaluators’ reports, social capital has marginally more mention and 
status. It arises in the assessment of “Sample 150” by Acemoglu (2006).15 This is the 
article by Collier and Gunning (1999), “Explaining African Economic Performance”. 
It appeared in the Journal of Economic Literature, one of the leading economics 
journals especially for surveys, and it is widely used for teaching purposes. At best, 
the assessment is faint in its praise to the point of damning. The assessment of the 
piece mentions social capital three times. First, in response to the question, “Are the 
conclusions consistent with the research findings?”, it offers the answer, “No. The 
paper jumps to conclusions about social capital, while there is nothing in previous 
research or even in this paper that suggests that social capital is a major factor”. And 
it adds for the question, “If applicable, are policy recommendations commensurate 
with the findings? No. The evidence does not support social capital and the related 
policy recommendations”. 
 
 This is a reasonable assessment although it should be added that Collier and 
Gunning mention social capital in their piece over thirty times, confining it to its 
impact on enforcement and learning and, otherwise, monotonously repeating the lack 
of social capital as a reason for poor economic performance in Africa. If genuinely 
and fully concerned with the role of World Bank research, Deaton might reasonably 
have asked why such a prominent piece, in such a prominent journal, emanating from 
such prominent authors should have appeared at all with such superficial analysis to 
the fore. And this is neither accidental nor marginal, as Collier not only served as 
Director of the Development Research Group at the World Bank from 1998 to 2003, 
but is also Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford 
University which has played a major role in training African economists in line with 
World Bank thinking. Further, the main Deaton Report is scathing, as already 
revealed, over the work with which Collier is heavily associated concerning the 
impact of aid, and offers mixed support for his work on civil war and violence.16 In 
short, particularly but not exclusively given his more recent high profile role through 
promotion of his latest book, Collier (2007), the example of his work, whether 
engaging social capital or otherwise, is evidence of the endemic nature of dissonance 
across scholarship, advocacy and policy at the World Bank from the highest levels 
down, Chief Economists excepted perhaps? 
 
 As evaluator, Duflo (2006, p. 1) is more upbeat, at least in passing, over the 
significance of social capital, placing it on a par with culture and poverty, “The 
research I was asked to evaluate is arguably all on important issues for developing 
countries (culture, social capital, poverty)”. Otherwise, there is reference to a project 
with title, “Social Capital”. This engages in participatory econometrics, “a 
methodological theme that is not necessarily linked to work on social capital”, p. 7. In 
addition, “a theoretical paper on the possible impacts of different forms of social 
capital on health” is one “which I did not find illuminating”, and it would have been 
better to have “put some of these ideas to the test”, p. 8. Last, on a project with title 
“Social Exclusion and Poverty”, the chapters from WDR for 2000, “leave a little bit 
of a feeling of concluding that ‘good things are good’ (i.e. social capital is good, but 
not when it exclude the poor)”,  p. 12. 
 
The only other reference to social capital across the Reports comes from 
Galiani (2006, p. 30) in assessing the paper by Alatas et al (2002) on local governance 
in Indonesia. It is observed that “the authors seem knowledgeable of previous 
research on social capital, from various disciplines. They also show a deep familiarity 
with the history and present of Indonesia”. Indeed, they do. It leads them to be most 
cautious about drawing “good is good” or policy conclusions. Galiani reports that, 
“The findings of the paper do not directly suggest any policy recommendations, as the 
authors point out … Relatively little is known about how to use ‘knowledge about the 
existing empirical associations between social activities and governance to engineer 
improvements in local governance through deliberate … policy actions’”, pp. 31-2.17 
Such caution represents a relatively sophisticated take on social capital by the authors,  
 
Overall, they are clearly aware that social capital is hard to define. Early on, 
they caution, “We are self-consciously avoiding for now the obvious, but loaded and 
imprecise, term ‘social capital’ and are first just reporting on the empirical outcome of  
a survey”, p. 6. And, equally, social capital is hard to measure, and hard to locate 
theoretically, empirically and policy-wise. As a result, p. 42: 
 
On a broader level this empirical work extends the literature on ‘social capital’ 
by demonstrating conclusively that not all local organizations are created 
equal. Depending on who is doing the organizing, and why, increased 
participation in local organizations can either be exclusionary and reinforce 
existing decision making powers and structures … or can widen the base of 
voice, information, and participation and increase the responsiveness of local 
government. 
 
In other words, social capital is useless for advocacy unless these somewhat major 
stumbling blocks over definition, measurement and analytical and policy location are 
overlooked, as in the piece by Collier and Gunning, and by the World Bank more 
generally albeit for other purposes, see Section 6.  
 
4 Deaton and Health 
 
 Given its significance, Deaton could hardly neglect health in the way that it 
does for social capital. Yet, the Reports offer very little substantive coverage of health 
although it is frequently mentioned. To some extent, this reflects the low status of 
health within Bank research, Population and Health figuring ninth in number of 
contributions across eleven categories of research in terms of output, p. 33. Within the 
Deaton Report itself, considerable emphasis is placed upon two contributions made by 
Bank research. One is in the measurement of health inequalities. Indeed, “Bank 
economists have led the world in the measurement of poverty and inequality, 
including inequality in health. Pioneering research on the organization and delivery of 
educational and health services is changing the way we think about these issues and 
the way that the Bank lends money for such projects”, p. 6. The other area singled out 
for praise by Deaton is the micro-level study of health delivery, especially around 
issues such as provider absenteeism and competence, and their implications for 
inequality, cost and level of (appropriate) provision. This allows Deaton to jump off 
the fence and offer the view that, p. 47: 
 
Most of death and disease in poor countries is neither attributable to the 
absence of appropriate medicines, nor to a lack of an appropriate method of 
treatment, but comes, among other things, from failures of health delivery, so 
that work like this, which adds to our understanding of the mechanisms of 
failure, is of great importance. 
 
 This stance neatly complements Deaton’s (2007) own approach to health 
inequalities. His prestigious WIDER Annual Lecture carefully cautions over the 
problems of measuring health inequalities and explaining their incidence across time 
and place through unduly crude methods and hypotheses, not least in light of the 
variation of experience across countries in terms of per capita income and in response 
to high or low rates of economic growth. In short, in closing his lecture, p. 22: 
 
My best guess is that health improvements in poor countries are not primarily 
driven by income, nor even by improvements in health knowledge and 
technology … over periods as long as decades, it is the social factors that 
make for effective delivery of health that are vital, particularly levels of 
education, and the development of population health as a political priority, 
which itself depends on better education and on the widespread idea that better 
health is both a possibility and a right. 
 
Clearly, the praise for Bank research in the Deaton Reports conforms to this stance, 
otherwise it can be anticipated to have received a roasting on the scale otherwise 
almost exclusively reserved for that on aid.  
 
 This suggests that the best way to view Deaton on health is through a 
counterfactual – what if Dollar, Collier and others had done an aid job on health. This 
is not so fanciful as the following quote reveals from a lead economist at the Bank. 
For, in closing an article on the global impact on growth of HIV/AIDS, Bonnel (2000, 
p. 849) asserts:18 
Reversing the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemics and mitigating its impact will 
therefore require three sets of measures: 
(i) Sound macroeconomic policies … 
(ii) Structural policy reforms … 
(iii) Modifying further the system of incentives faced by individuals. 
 
This manages to suffer simultaneously from both what I dub the XY and the XYZ 
syndromes characteristic of Bank research (and advocacy). The XY syndrome takes 
two highly complex issues (HIV/AIDS and growth for example), and proceeds as if, 
by putting them together, the complexity evaporates rather than intensifying. The 
XYZ syndrome suggests that good policies, X, are good for growth, Y, and growth is 
good for everything else, Z. The aid, growth, poverty contributions of the Bank fall 
into the same syndromes, if less crudely, and are duly treated contemptuously by 
Deaton and perceived to have been motivated by an imperative of advocacy over 
scholarship. 
 
 No doubt the same would have happened if health had been given the same 
treatment by the Bank. But it was not, certainly not to the same degree, and it is worth 
speculating over why, how and with what implications. First, over the period covered 
by Deaton, neo-liberal policies attached to health had been discredited, especially the 
imposition of user charges.19 Second, then, this would have been a more sensitive and 
contested arena into which to advocate market-based reform. Third, it is to be 
suspected that scholarly and personal dispositions within the field of health are more 
inclined to favour public provision, especially in reaching the poor. Fourth, this is all 
liable to be embedded in scholarly traditions of detailed micro-level research. Fifth, 
this explains why health research might both have enjoyed a degree of flexibility but 
equally to have been neglected in terms of high profile advocacy and research and 
policy promotion. It is not so readily amenable to the XY and XYZ syndromes. 
 
 This is borne out by reference to the Deaton Reports. First, there is a notable 
absence, as previously observed more generally, of discussion of the “big questions”, 
relating to the shift in Bank thinking, and the way in which it feeds into scholarship, 
advocacy and policy. There is one illustrative exception from Foster’s (2006, p. 10) 
evaluation of Kapstein and Milanovic (2001), quoted at length for raising the issues 
that are simply otherwise set aside elsewhere: 
 
This is a big think piece combining some literature review and some analysis 
exploring the relationship between globalization on the one hand and the 
development of an efficient and effective social welfare state on the other. The 
article notes the increasing trend toward increased means-testing, 
privatization, and decentralization of social welfare programs, and seems 
generally supportive of these transitions. At the heart of the issue of opening 
an economy to the outside world, or whether they reflect particular processes 
inclusive of the perspective of international institutions and domestic political 
institutions. The paper does not seem particularly analytical in its perspective 
and its conclusions are correspondingly weak. One is struck by the relatively 
limited discussion of trends in political processes in developing countries. 
Arguably, democratization and increasing literacy, which may have changed 
the dynamics of participation among the poor, have become powerful forces 
promoting social welfare programs that target large groups of the poor. 
Another important feature may well be the effects of globalization on returns 
to human capital and thus the interests in a better educated/healthier 
workforce. 
 
With regard to health, and welfare more generally, should Deaton not have noted and 
assessed the shifting positions of the Bank on provision? 
 
Second, at the other extreme, of the lesser questions that might have been 
heavily promoted for their significance, Duflo (2006) reports on a number of 
“fascinating projects”, one examining the knock-on effects in Ghana on take-up of 
other health services (measles vaccination and ante-natal care) at the time of free 
distribution of insecticide treated bed nets. She is puzzled why such projects should 
not be in receipt of more research support and dissemination. Duflo also looks at the 
cost of mental health in Bosnia and Herzegovina. She reviews one paper indicating 
that “faith based health providers in Uganda function better than public hospitals and 
that money given to them has a large impact on variables that lead to better health 
outcomes” although advising, without anything other than an economist’s keen eye 
for self-interest, that, “If one started giving more money to faith based health 
providers, the selection into who became a faith based health provider would very 
likely change rather dramatically”, p. 9. Udry (2006) suggests there is not “sufficient 
work on the effectiveness of rural health care delivery systems. The Bank has a 
responsibility to lead in this area”, emphasis added, p. 2. And Foster (2006) for 
example considers the impact of health on scale economies in households in 
transitional economies, the impact of waste management on health, the low 
correlation between subjective and objective measures of well-being in the presence 
of pesticide use.  
 
 What these, and other reviewed projects at the micro-level share in common is 
that they do not offer simple material for Bank advocacy, especially along the lines of 
market versus (or even plus) state provision. In light of section 7 below, Birdsall’s 
(2006, p. 5) conclusion is revealing:20 
 
Of all the potential research that could be done with health, I would put the 
highest priority for Bank research … on health systems. The Bank is probably 
better placed, because of its depth in economics, than other institutions to 
address health financing, organization and other system issues. And it is 
probably better placed than most economists in academe because its 
operations by their nature tend to provide support to and through the health 
systems of member countries. Good research on health systems has as much or 
more chance to lead to policy changes in the way systems are organized and 
financed as other kinds of health research, even on inequalities. Research on 
health systems can be useful for program design within the constraints of 
health systems but less useful on the non-marginal issues that health system 
problems pose. 
 
Not surprisingly, then, the research on health garners Deaton’s strongest 
“particular praise”, p. 46. It includes teacher and health worker absenteeism, 
published as Chaudhury et al (2006) and relative competence and effort of private and 
public doctors, Das and Hammer (2005), to which can be added equity in treatment 
and payment across health disasters and for different countries at different levels of 
development (how and whether it is possible to be pro-poor), Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer (2001) and, ultimately, O’Donnell et al (2007). What is characteristic of 
these studies is the methodological inclination to depend upon mainstream economics, 
close scrutiny of the empirical evidence, and the reluctance to draw conclusions in 
favour of market provision alone or as priority.  
 
 There is, however, at least one exception, the paper by Galiani et al (2005) 
reported upon by Kremer (2006, p. 41): 
 
The water privatization paper uses variation in ownership of water provision 
across time and space generated by the privatization process, and finds that 
child mortality fell 8 percent in the areas that privatized their water services 
and that the effect was largest (26 percent) in the poorest areas. To check the 
robustness of these estimates, they use information on cause-specific 
mortality; while privatization is associated with significant reductions in 
deaths from infectious and parasitic diseases, it is uncorrelated with death 
from causes unrelated to water conditions. I highlight this paper not only 
because is constitutes good careful research about a policy relevant issue in 
infrastructure in developing countries, but also because it provides strong 
evidence against a widely perceived view, in this case, that water privatization 
is bad for social outcomes. 
 
The conclusions from this case study are, indeed, heavily controversial. Bayliss and 
Fine (2007, p. 42) observe that the privatised water services were in receipt of 
substantial donor support, not least from the World Bank.21 They also argue that: 
 
The point here is not simply to contest the statistical exercise undertaken although 
regression analysis is better at establishing correlation as opposed to causation. 
However, in order to reach these estimates, correction needs to be made for a 
whole host of other variables such as housing conditions, poverty, sewerage, 
income level, inequality, political party in power, etc. At least implicitly, this is to 
accept the diversity and complexity of the mechanisms by which water provision 
(private or public) influences health outcomes. No one, after all, got healthier 
simply by virtue of ownership of water supply. It follows that if benefits are to be 
sustained, such mechanisms from how water is owned and provided to health, need 
to be identified and maintained. Such would be the responsibility of water and 
health authorities, carefully identifying how it is that water provision has 
contributed to health and what balance of public and private activity is necessary 
for it to continue to do so. 
Whilst the assessment of the treatment of the public/private divide in provision will be 
covered separately, it is of paramount significance for health which will continue to 
be profoundly affected by the shifting relationship between scholarship, rhetoric and 
policy, not least with the latter promoting the private sector as far as possible 
irrespective of the other two, Bayliss and Fine (2007). 
  
5 Social Capital and the World Bank 
 
 In earlier work over the last decade or more, I have been the fiercest critic of 
social capital, arguing that it should be rejected. Whilst I have been variously accused 
for this of being extreme, a Marxist and an economist, the leading reason offered for 
doing away with social capital is that it represents and promotes the dumbing down 
and degradation of social science. In brief, this is because it has evolved from rational 
choice origins which it conceals rather than escapes; it is universally and chaotically 
defined and applied across multitudes of applications that have little or no connection 
with one another; it overlooks or subordinates standard variables in social theory such 
as class, power, and conflict; it claims to complement the economic with the social 
and to take civil society seriously whereas it at most uncritically accepts the market 
imperfection version of economics and parasitically appropriates, misrepresents, and 
reduces the understanding of both the social and civil society, elevating the 
significance of the latter at the expense of the state; and this all leads it to promote 
self-help at the collective level without challenging the root causes of deprivation and 
oppression. In addition, it has fuelled opportunism in academia in research, funding 
and popularisation. With few exceptions, the laying down of these criticisms, by 
others as well as myself, has remained unanswered, another unfortunate characteristic 
of the literature as critique is distorted and only partially absorbed by way of 
legitimising continuing use, see below.  
 
 As a result of its continuing evolution across the social sciences, I have 
recently dubbed social capital as the McDonaldisation of social theory.22 The leading 
social capitalist, Robert Putnam, is the Ronald McDonald of the approach, having 
been the single most cited author across the social sciences in the 1990s. Almost 
every article on social capital cites his work, and probably at least half of them 
contain explicit or implicit criticism of one sort or another of his approach, his 
methods, his results, their significance, his interpretation, their generality, his 
inconsistencies, and so on. He has answered none of these and, in his latest work, 
arguing that diverse ethnicity is associated with low social capital, he ignores relevant 
literature to construct his own self-critique for response to sustain the view that 
bridging social capital is the way to respond, Putnam (2007). This is a significant 
descent into clowning even beyond the idea that social capital was laid down in 
twelfth century Italy at the expense of development in the south into the twentieth 
century, and the golden age of civil America declined over the generation dedicated to 
watching TV, see below on health also. 
 
But, despite its recent vintage of essentially no more than two decades, social 
capital already has a substantive history and dynamic.23 It began in the early 1980s 
with the radical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, emphasising reproduction of power, 
stratification and context. These elements were discarded with the adoption of the 
term by the rational choice sociologist James Coleman in the late 1980s. His 
approach, though, had the fortune of escaping the scourge of postmodernist critique 
but the misfortune of falling out of fashion with the decline of intellectual popularity 
of pure forms of neo-liberalism in the 1990s.24 Putnam (1993) opportunistically and 
casually drew upon Coleman whilst shedding his rational choice overtones, paving the 
way for social capital to become the key concept in that second phase of neo-
liberalism, based upon both promoting the “market” at the expense of the state and 
ameliorating its worst excesses. 
 
Over the past decade, social capital has grown without apparent limit both 
across what it is and what it can do. How is in part apparent from its status as a 
middle-range theory, and social capital is notable for offering little or no innovation at 
a grander level. Diagram 1 has given way to diagrams 2 and 3, once imposed upon 
one another, with social capital fragmented into any number of variables (diagram 2), 
potentially with positive, negative or reverse causation (diagrams 2 and 3 without 
reverse arrows), and able to be situated alongside conditioning or causal variables A 
and B (diagram 3), or even to incorporate them within the definition of social capital 
itself. Diagrams at end of paper before footnotes. 
 
This has involved bringing back in, BBI, any number of those variables that 
were previously excluded. But it creates enormous problems for social capital. First, it 
has become definitionally chaotic, with each and every application potentially 
redefining or refining what is meant by social capital. Second, insofar as the definition 
of social capital and its impact depend upon variables A and B, then each and every 
social capital is different from one case to the next, and there is no reason to presume 
there are either comparative implications or that one social capital is the same as any 
other. Third, there is the danger of social capital becoming little more than a 
descriptive tautology, with social capital being present and positive in its effects 
whenever outcomes are deemed to be better than if it were not present. 
 
To a large extent, these conundrums have been, unsatisfactorily, addressed by 
seeking to disaggregate social capital into lower level but still broad categories. These 
have been the cognitive, the relational and the network, for example, as well as 
bonding (within groups), bridging (across groups) and the linking (variously across 
hierarchies and from civil society to the state). The problem is that such fixes are 
simply shattered by the equally broad but far less analytically neutral categories such 
as class, gender, ethnicity and race. But the strategy of BBI missing elements is 
wonderfully illustrated by Simon Szreter (2002a and b), Putnam’s reduced 
counterpart in the UK ably complemented by Halpern (2005) who served in a 
research capacity in Tony Blair’s Office. Szreter seeks to rescue social capital from 
criticism by BBI class, power, politics, ideology, mass unemployment, globalisation, 
inequality, hierarchy, the state, and history, alongside a whole array of other analytical 
fragments.25 And the motivation and goals for this exercise are offered with crystal 
clarity, Szreter (2002b, p. 580): 
 
It is implicit in this reading of social capital theory that there is an optimal 
dynamic balance of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital, which 
simultaneously facilitates democratic governance, economic efficiency and 
widely-dispersed human welfare, capabilities and functioning. 
 
If class, power, and conflict, etc, are to be brought back in, it will be in a relatively 
tame version. 
 
 Such considerations set the context within which the World Bank heavily 
promoted social capital over the first half of the period covered by Deaton. Its first 
major study, relatively highly profiled, suggested that joining a burial society in a 
Tanzanian village was more effective for the individual concerned and for the rest of 
the village that female education in reducing poverty, Narayan and Pritchett (1997). 
This was followed by a major research programme, including ten or more well-funded 
projects, one addressing differential mortality, health and well-being in post-transition 
Russia as a consequence of incidence of social capital, Fine (2001) for full account. 
 
As I recognised at an early stage, Fine (1999),26 and apparent from earlier 
discussion, social capital offered an ideal conduit for the transition between 
Washington and post Washington Consensus. But, much more than this, as also 
anticipated at the time, the marginalised and small minority of non-economists at the 
Bank saw it as an opportunity to promote their own status and way of thinking within 
the Bank, and as a means to civilise economists into taking their contributions and the 
social more seriously. This is now all accepted in retrospect, Bebbington et al (2004 
and 2006) and Fine (2008a) for critique, complemented by the highly questionable 
judgement that the strategy succeeded and was worth the compromises that had to be 
made. By the early years of the millennium, the World Bank’s social capitalists were 
already suggesting that their strategy had succeeded, social capital was no longer 
needed as a wedge within the Bank, and they could move on to other issues such as 
empowerment. 
 
Bebbington et al was already appearing in first drafts in 2002. It is remarkable, 
almost unique, for revealing some of the inner workings of the Bank and the 
motivation of its staff given the proscription and penalties imposed for going public. It 
is all anomalous, especially for the free rein given to the authors by the Bank and in 
light of the later commentary by Rao and Woolcock (2006)27 on Deaton (see below), 
and, in addition, the timing embodied in the strategic confessions is problematic given 
the continuing momentum behind social capital displayed by the Bank’s social 
capitalists (in publications, etc). Part of the explanation must lie somewhere within the 
boundaries of retrospective self-delusion, self-justification, self-promotion and, to be 
frank, deceit to which a disposition is both confessed and rationalised as a way of 
bringing progressive change within the Bank to the advantage of the impoverished 
without.  
 
These might be thought to be unduly harsh and inappropriate judgements in a 
scholarly environment. But this is no more than descending to the level of individuals 
within the Bank rather than leaving the gap between advocacy and scholarship, 
emphasised by Deaton, at the institutional level. After all, the gap has to be the result 
either of poor or deceitful scholarship, or some combination of the two. And 
Bebbington et al do justify their account of the promotion of social capital in terms of 
inner workings and motives within the Bank to which they alone had privileged 
access and responsibility.28 These considerations aside, it is more appropriate to 
perceive their strategy of reforming the thinking and practice of the Bank to have 
failed on its own terms, even more so if considered on a broader basis than for 
implications within the Bank alone. 
 
For, first, economists at the Bank hardly needed to be persuaded to incorporate 
non-economic variables into their analysis in light of freakonomics imperialism and 
its application to development. As discussed above in case of Collier, and on a much 
broader terrain of subject matter and individuals, the promotion of social capital had 
the perverse effect not only of legitimising the role of economists within the Bank but 
also of allowing that role to be extended to the non-economic. 
 
Second, the goal of elevating the status of non-economists has hardly been 
achieved and especially through the medium of social capital. Ironically, the Deaton 
Report could not be more scathing about social capital where it does not ignore its 
contribution to research within the Bank. And Rao and Woolcock (2006) feel 
compelled to reiterate, after the social capital deluge within the Bank, that non-
economists are so marginalised that Deaton does not even consider using an assessor 
of research who is not an economist. 
 
Third, irrespective of whether social capital had the effect of adding the social 
in some form to the economic within the Bank, what it did not do is to change the 
economic itself. The economics of the Bank is sorely deficient in content and scope, 
at most stretching to the boundaries allowed by the post Washington Consensus in 
scholarship, rhetoric and policy. Indeed, even those limits proved to be unacceptable 
to the Bank as evidenced by the departure of Stiglitz. The social capitalists within the 
Bank were and have remained remarkably quiet over this episode even though their 
own prospects of socialising economists within the Bank surely depended upon both a 
more favourable economics and its more favourable marriage with the social.29 
 
Fourth, one of the most striking but only occasionally observed features of 
social capital is that it has had practically no (overt and established) impact upon 
policymaking. Where are the studies, within the Bank or otherwise, which report that 
we set out to create social capital to bring about this outcome, and we succeeded? 
Even Bebbington et al (2006) rely upon limited evidence without independent 
assessment. Amazingly, the Bank’s website for social capital has a link for “Social 
Capital and Policy”, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOP
MENT/EXTTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,contentMDK:20186552~menuPK:418214~page
PK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html#. It is non-functional although 
the website itself also began to die from early 2000. 
 
Fifth, even more significant are the policy shifts that were occurring within the 
Bank over which social capital had no purchase or comment to make. In particular, 
despite a rhetoric of retreat from dogmatic support for privatisation, the Bank has set 
about shifting support for infrastructural provision from the public to the private 
sector. However much social capital may have improved given project performance, 
the shifting composition of project funding was not addressed even though the impact 
upon “social capital” itself may have been considered to have been far from negligible 
with the introduction of private in place of public provision. 
 
Sixth, the pre-occupation with promoting social capital within the Bank was 
complemented by an extraordinary degree of external promotion, incorporating far 
more progressive donor agencies and the development community more widely. This 
had the effect of undermining the potential for more external pressure on the Bank in 
deference to the putative internal force for change deriving from social capital. 
 
Seventh, the manoeuvrings of the social capitalists at the Bank are indicative 
of the McDonaldisation of social theory, not least in being academically deceitful. 
Over the time that social capital was being promoted within the Bank, there was no 
engagement with external criticism although there was heavy promotion of social 
capital. Once it was decided that social capital had done its job within the Bank, all 
the criticisms that had been made of it were essentially accepted. The implications for 
the status of scholarship within the Bank let alone in engaging in debate are 
staggering, especially for a knowledge bank. 
 
Last, with its rise and fall within the Bank, the status quo ex ante is not 
restored as far as social capital is concerned. For, the Bank played a major role in 
promoting the concept within development and more broadly, although it had an 
independent momentum of its own, not least through the Putnam phenomenon (who 
vice-versa played an initiating role at the Bank as well). Casual observation does 
suggest that there was a dip in the popularity of social capital across the social 
sciences as the World Bank withdrew its support. But it has now regathered lost 
momentum from within and on from the Bank, not least in the field of health. 
 
6 Social Capital and Health 
 
 As with other applications, the study of the social determinants of health, 
SDH, was well-established long before social capital appeared on the scene. At that 
time, the field was heavily influence by the idea that (income) inequality is a major 
source of ill-health as a result of stress-induced relative deprivation. This approach 
has the benefit of moving away from medicalised and individualised accounts, with 
inequality potentially serving as a proxy for oppressive social relations, practices and 
conditions in general. Nonetheless, there is a weakness in establishing the 
mechanisms through which inequality translates into health outcomes,30 and a neglect 
of the broader determinants of inequality itself and their more immediate and direct 
impact on health, giving rise to the so-called political economy approach to the SDH, 
Navarro (ed) (2007) for example. Social capital offered the opportunity, opportunism 
even, for the inequality approach to support its position with the benefit of what 
appeared to be a well-established concept from across the social sciences. 
 
Even so, as late as the volume of Marmot and Wilkinson (eds) (1999), from 
two of the leading British scholars, social capital scarcely warrants a mention. 
Kawachi and Wamala (eds) (2007) only contains a few passing references to social 
capital, none in the three contributions of Kawachi himself!31 This is despite Kawachi 
being one of the leading academics on SDH in the United States and a heavy 
promoter of social capital, Kawachi et al (1997) for a relatively early contribution. His 
own social capital is notable in this respect. He moderated the World Bank’s 
electronic social capital newsletter, and he co-authored an article with Putnam on 
social capital and firearm ownership across the United States, Hemenway et al (2001). 
This regresses ownership against times gone bowling in the previous year, played 
cards, entertained at home, greeting cards sent, and dinner parties attended. It accepts 
that issues such as race, urbanisation and poverty were omitted, and that correlation 
and causation have not been distinguished.32 The National Riflemen’s Association 
does not warrant a mention (although going to church is found, if insignificant, to 
raise possession).33 
 
 This is just the unacceptable tip of the iceberg of standard empiricist fare as far 
as application of social capital to health is concerned. Other studies, using various 
measures and methods have covered smoking and binge drinking (within a putative 
Bourdieu framework), Carpiano (2006 and 2007), impact of speaking Swedish (higher 
status) or Finnish in Finland, Nyqvist et al (2008) and Hyyppä and Mäki (2003), 
mental health, Almedom (2005) and Lofors and Sundquist (2007), de Silva et al 
(2007) and Miller et al (2006), coronary heart disease, Sundquist et al (2004 and 
2006), self-reported health with or without ethnic discrimination, Kavanagh et al 
(2006), Lindström (2008) and Sundquist and Yang (2007), and Mansyur et al (2008), 
respectively, teen pregnancy and “risky” and pre-marital sexual activity, Crosby and 
Holtgrave (2006), Crosby et al (2003), Gold et al (2002) and Djamba (2003), 
employee health at work, Oksanen et al (2008), cancer and crime, Islam et al (2008), 
life satisfaction and well-being, Yamaoka (2008), being overweight, Wakefield and 
Poland (2005), drug addiction and treatment, Cheung and Cheung (2003) and Mooney 
(2005), depressed mothers of young children, Mulvaney and Kendrick (2005), , 
cannabis smoking, Lindström (2004), low birth weight, accidents and suicide, Folland 
(2008), suicide, Haynie et al (2006), indigenous health, Morrissey (2006), fatalism, 
Lindström (2006), alcohol consumption, Lindström (2005) and Bischof et al (2003), 
children’s health Drukker et al (2003), violence, Galea et al (2002), volunteering, 
Blakely et al (2006), kidney donation, Morgan et al (2006), keeping of pets, Wood et 
al (2005 and 2007), and dental caries Pattussi et al (2006).34 
 
 As a result, the proliferation of studies such as these has conformed to the 
McDonaldisation of the study of the SDH, with similar character and dynamic, 
especially of definitional and operational chaos (with limited policy implications) and 
BBI what has previously been omitted. At a relatively early stage, Macinko and 
Starfield (2001) offer genuine insight into the impact of social capital on study of 
SDH despite, or even because of, treating social capital as an element in a production 
function for health. From the literature, they identify four ways that social capital 
affects health: pathways; networks; mediator in health policy and reform; and 
elements of social deprivation. Based on a literature review, they also offer seven 
elements for a research agenda that include: clarify the concept; explore pathways or 
mechanisms and distinguish from material conditions; develop a core set of social 
capital variables with internal consistency and psychometric testing, otherwise better 
to rely upon interpersonal trust, membership in groups, etc, individually rather than 
grouping these together in a single index; different aspects of health across different 
groups; sort out the effects of gender, class, region, etc; identify the origins of social 
capital; draw out implications for policy from creating social capital; and cause and 
effect. Not unreasonably, with little or no prospect of this wish list being addressed as 
opposed to undermined, they conclude, “the concept has been stretched, modified, 
and extrapolated to cover so many types of relationships at so many levels of 
individual, group, institutional, and state analysis that the term has lost all heuristic 
value”, p. 394. Equally, it has gained chaotic value. 
 
Similarly, Muntaner et al (2001, p. 213) are able to report, “we have witnessed 
the rapid appearance of the concept of social capital in public health discourse”. They 
point, following the earlier survey of Hawe and Shiell (2000),35 to the use of social 
capital as all that good in a community but at least allowing for non-individualised 
approaches to SDH to be adopted albeit along the lines of mobilising society to put 
the sick Humpty Dumpty back together. For, “In social epidemiology, more 
specifically, social capital presents a model of the social determinants of health that 
excludes any analysis of structural inequalities (e.g., class, gender, or racial/ethnic 
relations) in favor of a horizontal view of social relations based on distributive 
inequalities in income. As a consequence, political movements based on class, 
race/ethnicity, or gender are also ignored as explanations for reducing social 
inequalities in health”. This, in a sense, is an invitation, intended or not, to BBI all of 
those omitted factors, one that has been enthusiastically embraced in the subsequent 
literature, further adding to definitional chaos as in other applications of social capital.  
 
But, as I have emphasised for the invasion by social capital of other fields, 
there are peculiarities in each case reflecting the nature of the subject matter and the 
traditions within which it has been addressed (as well as timing and even personalities 
of incursion).36 For SDH, this has meant a more than normally active opposition. In 
part, this is based upon a closer pre-occupation with mechanisms and causation given 
that the end result of (individual) (ill-)health is unavoidable. As Leeder (1998, p. 7) 
puts it, “for social capital to be useful for public health, there is a need to link it to 
epidemiological inquiry, with its irritating restrictions and ineradicable connection to 
reductionist science ... Classical epidemiology has in fact served us astonishingly 
well, and to discard it in favour of something less defined, more spiritual and social-
elitist, would be a major mistake … especially so if, as a substitute, vague 
descriptions of social phenomena, such as social capital, are proposed”. Even 
Kawachi (2001, p. 32), not for the first time, confesses that “the precise mechanisms 
underlying the connection between social capital and health still remain to be 
uncovered, but a great deal of evidence from epidemiology suggests that social 
support is an important determinant of longevity and quality of life”. In addition, 
social epidemiology has given birth to a strong strand of radical scholarship in 
identifying SDH in opposition to more medicalised and individualised approaches that 
are unduly undersocialised. Corresponding scholars have reasonably viewed with 
dismay the displacement of race, class, gender, the imperatives of capitalism, and so 
on, by the amorphous and bland notion of social capital.  
 
Even more distinctive overall in the social capital contributions to study of the 
SDH is the level of systemic, and individual honesty and integrity in empirical work. 
On casual observation, across the various case studies reported, something like a third 
report no impact of social capital on health. I suspect this to be unusual across the 
social sciences in any field. There is a very strong bias, especially within economics, 
to solicit and report positive results in a statistical sense. Individuals search and 
manipulate until them find them, and outlets publish accordingly. But health is 
different, possibly because of its attachment to medicine and treatment, with a 
tradition of placebos and drug and treatment trials.  
 
For similar reasons, a further substantial proportion of case studies suggest 
that, even though social capital has an effect, it is much less important than other 
factors with access to material resources to the fore. In addition, the traditional 
cautions attached to statistical work are more than normally attended to.37 These 
include not confusing correlation with causation. The following is typical in its 
conclusion, and endearing in its content. Miller et al (2006, p. 1085) find, “an increase 
by one standard deviation (measured at the village level) in social capital is associated 
with a decreased propensity to report feeling sad of 2% points, a 14% decline from the 
mean level”.38 Most important seem to be the presence of a pharmacy garden and 
family planner’s acceptance groups. “This may not be surprising given that both 
group activities/forms of social capital are health-related. While one cannot interpret 
our estimates as the causal impact of social capital on health, our findings are 
suggestive that a research design able to delineate the causal relationships would be 
worthwhile”, p. 1096. Also more care than is normally found across the social capital 
literature is given to the definition and measurement of social capital, the relations 
between micro and macro effects, and to the mechanisms, or health pathways, by 
which social capital might be deemed to function, Milyo and Mellor (2003), 
Almedom (2005), Taylor et al (2006), De Silva et al (2006), Stephens (2008), and 
Veenstra et al (2005) for some telling and varied contributions. 
 
 Of crucial significance in these respects are the extremely diverse and 
unavoidable causes, consequences and mechanisms relating health to social, material 
and individual circumstances. As a result, not least in light of the diagrams offered 
previously and the more than normally careful degree of empirical investigation and 
qualification attached to case studies, the majority of these heavily emphasise the 
extent to which, if there is a social capital effect, it is highly conditioned by the 
presence or not of other factors. Inevitably, this raises doubts about the universal 
applicability of a notion of social capital and the prospective dangers of relying upon 
it whilst setting aside those conditioning factors. 
 
 In this light, it is hardly surprising that the International Journal of 
Epidemiology should hold a fiercely contested debate over social capital, significantly 
introduced by Ebrahim (2004) as “Social Capital: Everything or Nothing?”. Striking 
is that the case in favour should be made by Szreter and Woolcock (2004a and b),39 
ably supported by Putnam (2004) and Kawachi et al (2004). McDonaldisation was out 
in force.40 Their contributions are remarkable for their inconsistencies, 
misrepresentations, errors and emptiness. Thus, Szreter and Woolcock (2004b, p. 700) 
ambitiously locate social capital in the grand scheme of social science: 
 
The broad dialectical challenge in social theory is (or should be) addressing 
the structure-agency problem (also known as the micro-macro problem) – that 
is, unpacking the interactions and interconnections between individual choices 
and larger institutional forces. 
 
Social capital is perceived to address this challenge in the wake of its neglect under 
the influence of postmodernism and rational choice.41 It also offers a synthesis of the 
three traditional approaches to SDH - the radical political economy approach (its 
potential opponent), the inequality approach (in which relative deprivation causes 
stress and ill-health, and most closely associated with Wilkinson, and so already on 
board), and the social support approach (its most natural ally).  
 
 How is this to be done? First, with considerable honesty and, one suspects, to 
Putnam’s dismay,42 Szreter and Woolcock (2004a, p. 653) observe of social capital 
that, “Neither Robert Putnam (and his Harvard colleagues) nor Richard Wilkinson … 
have undertaken fundamental theoretical work on the concept”. They rectify this by 
the simple expedient of positing bonding, bridging, and linking social capital. Yet, the 
result, by their own confession, is relatively modest. For, “the compelling point being 
argued by proponents of the social capital perspective is that, without taking into 
account the independent effects of the workings of all three forms of social capital, 
our understanding remains incomplete. The crucial point about social capital is not 
that it provides a complete explanation for anything, but that most explanations are 
incomplete without it”, emphasis added, Szreter and Woolcock (2004b, p. 702).  
 
This quotation is crucial, revealing and slippery. For it falsely implies that 
rejection of social capital means omission of influences that are essential if not 
exhaustive. Indeed, this leads Szreter and Woolcock erroneously and scathingly to 
dismiss “political economy” critics as reductionist to class, in part by grand appeal to 
more rounded Marxists such as Eric Hobsbawm and EP Thompson, p. 703. But the 
political economy approach is much more nuanced than this in questioning the 
independent effect of whatever is deemed to be social capital, see below. Such social 
relations are not seen as reducible to class or whatever but, what is an entirely 
different matter, they are not allowed to be independent of it (any more, it might be 
added, than health is deemed by Szreter and Woolcock to be dependent upon social 
capital).43  
 
Second, then, at least implicit in the theory of Szreter and Woolcock is that 
social capital is an independent causal factor. This is made explicit in Putnam’s 
contribution, p. 670, in which a causal mapping is provided with inequality, social 
capital and the state/political economy as the three mutually interdependent base 
factors determining health outcomes. And this is correctly acknowledged to be 
necessary by both Putnam and Szreter and Woolcock for, otherwise, if social capital 
attaches to the state, the theory becomes a tautology. Social capital has both to range 
over some but not all social relations, and those it does incorporate have to exert some 
sort of independent effect of their own. Ellaway (2004, p. 681) succinctly poses the 
conundrums involved in such analytical acrobatics: 
 
Their definition of social capital makes it difficult to measure empirically. 
However, this difficulty is further complicated by the issue that social capital 
is likely to be a product of class position and intersects with other social 
categories such as gender and ethnicity. Different levels of networks and 
variations in equality in interactions with powerful groups have long been 
noted as a feature of class position, and measures of social stratification. This 
makes social capital difficult to test in statistical models with health as an 
outcome since controlling for social factors does not adequately remove their 
influence. 
 
In addition, the more radical political economy approach is reasonably suspicious, 
both in terms of social capital’s origins and content and dynamic in practice that the 
claim to BBI class, race, gender, other structural determinants, etc, is token in the 
sense of downplaying their significance as causal factors. For Navarro (2004a, p. 
673):44 
 
The key determinants of power in a society are the class (and race and gender) 
power relations that shape both civil society and political societies. Class 
relations (including class struggle) traverse and shape all dimensions of 
society – the state and the major institutions, including the major institutions 
of the knowledge and practice of health and medical care. There is no such 
thing as the “state” separate from civil society. There are state power relations 
that reproduce the class, race, and gender relations dominant in civil society. 
Szreter and Woolcock’s seeming unawareness of this also explains their lack 
of attention to the political context in which such power relations are 
reproduced … both civil society and political society respond the same class 
forces. 
 
Further, as is easily recognised, the elevation of both the status and independence of 
social capital as a causal variable is suggestive that policy can be effective 
independent of other causes, although these are confessed to be potentially if not 
more, important, “we are not arguing that social capital, however conceived, is or 
should be the sole or even the primary variable used to explain all public health 
outcomes”, Szreter and Woolcock (2004, p. 704). 
 
In practice, their own policy prescriptions go little beyond appealing to the 
building of cooperative relations for a common purpose. These might be thought to 
border on the embarrassing in seeking solutions “to the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa and 
elsewhere”. For, “If social capital’s key insight is that social relationships really 
matter, the focus in policy debates needs to unpack the black box of process to 
appreciate just how crucial are on-going face-to-face relationships to the delivery of 
key public health services, especially in developing countries”, Szreter and Woolcock 
(2004, p. 704). This is all seen as a complementary step to “efforts to lower the costs 
of producing and disseminating anti-retroviral drugs … [and] reducing the enormous 
stigmas (and misunderstandings) that still surround the disease”. Who could disagree 
but the analytical issue is not just how to lower costs but how the (health and 
pharmaceutical) systems to which they are attached constrain and influence both 
black box and stigma. For them, this is all reduced to “relationships within 
communities – that is linking social capital – that will, in turn, given them the 
credibility and leverage to help facilitate a long process of social change” p. 704. How 
the latter is to be achieved in absence of the considerations posed by the political 
economy approach to health remains a mystery other than in advising those now 
wedded to the social capital approach not to neglect the linking. For they continue, 
“On policy issues and in contexts such as this, a social capital conceptual arsenal 
restricted to a dichotomous ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ distinction is rendered needlessly 
tepid”, p. 704. 
 
This is indicative of the work that must be done by linking social capital, both 
analytically and strategically. The substance and limitations are beautifully and 
ironically summarised by Ellaway (2004, p. 681): 
 
A related problem with subtle refinements is that, given the popularity of the 
concept, decision makers of all political hues will have their own ideas and 
agendas. As the Taioseach (Prime Minister) for the Republic of Ireland, stated 
in a speech, “We all know that the level and nature of interaction between 
people and groups is crucial to public well-being. But social capital could, at 
one extreme, be seen as so general and aspirational as to be irrelevant: at the 
other extreme it could easily fall into being merely another way of promising 
old-style ideologies … I know that Prime Minister Blair has also shown a lot 
of interest in Professor Putnam’s work. Indeed, it is an indication of its [lack 
of] quality, that both President Clinton and his successor President Bush have 
been influenced by it.  
 
We have already indicated the neo-liberal roots of social capital in Buchanan and 
Coleman, a tradition that emphasises that both market relations, and the non-market 
relations to support them, are best left to individuals and which sees the spontaneous 
creation of social capital as an argument against state economic and social 
intervention. Significantly, in its modern reincarnation, Meadowcroft and Pennington 
(2007) see themselves as “Rescuing Social Capital from Social Democracy”. For New 
Labour and Third Wayism have become its natural home, as explicitly promoted by 
Szreter (2002a) himself,45 although there is now a burgeoning literature demonstrating 
how social capital has had little impact on policy as such but has rather been used as a 
rhetorical device to impose central control, devolve responsibility without resources, 
and manage dissent.  
 
 Third, in promoting social capital against these obstacles, Szreter and 
Woolcock simply ignore those criticisms, already laid out, that would appear to be 
impossible for them to answer. But they do respond when they can. Their original 
contribution offered an account of the role of erstwhile Liberal, Joseph Chamberlain, 
in promoting mortality decline in nineteenth century Birmingham. In rejoinder to 
Smith and Lynch (2004), that Chamberlain later became a racist imperialist is 
dismissed as irrelevant for being after the event (although this might bring into 
question the beneficial fluidity of social capital once it leaves the Birmingham bond 
and bridge). When Szreter (2004 and 2005) does respond, the latter to Razzell and 
Spence (2005), it becomes clear that social capital as an explanatory factor is hanging 
on by its fingernails given account for mortality decline must address timing, age- and 
gender-specific rates, and the major influence of changes in child labour, real wages, 
nutrition, working mothers, family size, and housing, etc, against which social capital 
might be thought to decline into insignificance. 
 
 The final, and weakest, argument in favour of social capital despite its 
limitations is offered by most of its proponents and, occasionally, by its critics. This is 
that at least social capital puts the appropriate issues on the agenda and seeks to 
reconcile competing views. This is, however, reminiscent of (the errors of) Deaton on 
the Bank’s shifting of the development agenda. This is never a neutral exercise in 
terms of content, limits and focal point as observed by critics across the entire social 
capital enterprise, with more radical and penetrating scholarship tending to be 
precluded or degraded if it is incorporated.   
 
Ultimately, Kawachi et al (2004, p. 689) accept that, “Unbridled enthusiasm 
for the adoption of social capital in public health has generated a backlash … Some of 
the criticisms – for example, the perception that social capital is a ‘cheap’ solution for 
solving public health problems, or the tendency to view social capital as a panacea 
whilst ignoring its negative aspects – are justified”. But, irrespective of this “and the 
formidable conceptual and methodological obstacles that remain”, they close by 
concluding these must be tackled “because for better or for worse (in terms of 
population health and outcomes), social capital is here to stay”.46 I wonder if they 
would have said the same of social eugenics in view of its impressive array of popular 
and academic support!  
 
Nor is this entirely some cheap jibe once we substitute the more acceptable 
social capital inspired social engineering for social eugenics. When social capital is 
measured by participation in local elections and is seen to be negatively correlated to 
mental ill-health, this can be used as a rationale for the location of mental institutions, 
Lofors and Sundquist (2007). Ferguson (2006, p. 8) argues that, “Empirical 
precedents suggest that families with high levels of family social capital have a two-
parent family structure, with the presence of a paternal figure … Lastly, there is some 
evidence that regular attendance by families and parochial education at Catholic 
schools for children are also positively correlated with high levels of community 
social capital”.47 Indeed, “of all the predictive factors associated with children’s well-
being, social capital – second only to poverty – has the highest influence on children’s 
development and attainment of future outcomes”, p. 9. The lack of social capital as a 
cause of crime and as a result of ethnic diversity attends us from our childhoods to our 
earlier graves.  
 
The policy implications are mind-boggling once engaged in these terms, with 
Walters (2002) pointing to social capital as “re-imagining politics”. With its being 
located at both individual and collective (cultural) levels, “social capital assesses 
politics in terms of social norms of performance rather than ideological legitimacy”, 
p. 386, not least because “a key presupposition of social capital theory is of the actor 
as a self-interested maximizing individual”. In the context of a state/society duality, 
social capital also holds out the promise of self-governance, as opposed to “an image 
of politics as a system defined by the poles of elites and the governed. With social 
capital this stark polarization gives way to an image of the polity as a much more 
horizontal space of multiple communities”, p. 388. This involves a shift from a “bio-
politics” – governing health, education and welfare in all its aspects – to ethopolitics, 
that of the population’s trust, civility, volunteering, communalism, etc, which become 
manageable aspects of the system. “Social capital brings the ambition of positivity 
and calculability to ethopolitical discourses … it offers a quantitative rendering of the 
ethical field, all the better to enhance its governability. It purports to make trust and 
civility measurable”, p. 390 – rendering a field day of critical opportunities for those 
trained in the tradition of Foucault.  
 
The result is that a new division can be added to the traditional ones between 
normal and pathological, sane and insane, social and anti-social, employed and 
unemployable, and excluded and included. It is the civic and uncivic, p. 392. But, 
unlike previous political theory and its notions of modernisation, “with social capital, 
this stagist, developmental trajectory is not evident. Across space and time, all 
societies are analysable in terms of social capital”, p. 395. Consequently, for the 
World Bank and other international agencies, “it could be that social capital will offer 
them another way to express concern for social injustices, but in such a way that they 
are not required to address the thorny matter of economic exploitation”, p. 394. 
 
7 Social Capital, Health, and the World Bank: Towards an Alternative 
 
 In the event, with or without health, social capital has moved off the World 
Bank’s agenda. But its influence on health studies, in part prompted by the Bank’s 
erstwhile social capitalists, continues to grow apace, not least with a flush of 
government surveys to assess the relationship between social capital and health.48 
This raises the strategic issue of whether social capital can be reformed or whether it 
should be rejected. For, despite its legion deficiencies, amply documented within the 
literature both for health and more generally, there is always the prospect of 
enhancing social capital, by BBI, and/or compromising to gain progress as most 
obviously attempted by the World Bank social capitalists in relation to their 
economist colleagues.  
 
With global warming, we have been advised that malaria may return to Italy. 
This reminds us of how the condition got its name – bad air. This is a totally wrong 
diagnosis but it is certainly conceivable that efforts to improve air quality may have 
inadvertently diminished the incidence of malaria. Could the same be true of social 
capital, a benaria for social theory?49 And, if not in general, could social capital not be 
beneficial for the study of the SDH in particular? 
 
As I have argued for other applications, attempts to reform social capital have 
been primarily marked by failure despite what are occasionally excellent criticisms 
and case studies, but with the latter more often than not critically accepting the 
language of social capital whilst otherwise rejecting it in its general practice. Such 
studies generally take the form of BBI, and especially BBI Bourdieu, to incorporate 
class, race, and gender, Campbell and McLean (2002) and Stephens (2008) for 
example. Inevitably, following Bourdieu, this involves the BBI of context, not only in 
the sense of full account of complementary causes and conditioning variables but also 
in terms of the construction of the meaning of health to practitioners themselves. 
Thus, Kreuter and Lezin (2002, p. ??) accept that “failure to take social and political 
context into account is a major barrier to the effective evaluation of community-based 
health promotion”, and they appropriately close with the observation that, “there are 
different ways of knowing, and different interpretations of ‘reality’ … an 
epidemiologist, an anthropologist, a health educator, and a layperson are likely to 
view a given problem through different lenses. More importantly, each is quite likely 
to detect a glimpse of reality that others may miss. All … need to seriously explore 
how their various views of reality can be combined to give us new knowledge”, p. ??.  
 
Thus, even though the social capital and SDH literature has been unusually if 
not absolutely diligent in qualifying the results of case studies, it still remains liable to 
overgeneralise and homogenise across what are different contexts both in 
circumstance and meaning. To this must be added the inclination to omit underlying 
causal factors associated with power, conflict and material deprivation. As a result, it 
is only possible to be pessimistic about the prospects of turning social capital into 
something more acceptable as an analytical tool. In principle, its diverse appeals to 
social relations presumes an illegitimate commonality across different case studies – 
one social capital is not the same as another, and one has no comparative lessons to 
draw from another. In practice, more nuanced studies in the BBI vein merely serve to 
legitimise, even to fuel, the continuing weight and momentum of standard social 
capital fare, offering more variables to the concept’s definitional lexicon. 
 
Interestingly, World Bank research has, with health and more generally, 
become increasingly sensitive to the issue of context. But it has done so in part as a 
response to the criticism that one model fits all and in part as a way of introducing the 
effect of institutions and market imperfections. As already indicated in pinpointing the 
perspective of Deaton, a heavy dose of economic rationality linked to incentives is 
involved. Significantly, Das and Hammer (2005, p.1) begin with a vignette which 
concludes with a doctor’s explanation of treatment: 
 
But if I tell the mother that she should go home and only give the child water 
with salt and sugar, she will never come back to me; she will only go to the 
next doctor who will give her all the medicines and then she will think that he 
is better than me. 
 
This is to enter the world of health beliefs on which there is no commentary as 
opposed to shifting the incentives of those offering treatment. It is hardly remedied by 
offering “Six sizes fit all” as a model for health and nutrition services, World Bank 
(2004, p. 155). 
 
 This is not, however, to prioritise health beliefs over material factors but to see 
them both as attached to a health system. As argued elsewhere, especially Bayliss and 
Fine (eds) (2007), health and other public services are subject to systemic provision 
and need to be addressed analytically and through policy as such. At best, from within 
mainstream economics, this is approached in the following terms through Blank’s 
(2000, pp. C47-C48) treatment of four influences in assessing the case for or against 
public/private provision: 
 
The degree of concern with agency problems and the degree of belief in 
government’s ability to be wisely paternalistic. 
 
The degree of concern over the difficulty in collecting and disseminating 
information on quality of services. 
 
The extent that equity and universalism is emphasised. 
 
The level of trust in the public sector. 
 
This is remarkably similar to the insights gleaned from social capital. But their 
application in practice is another matter. Such abstract truisms offer very little 
purchase on the nature of health service provision, whether in developing countries or 
not. There is also little or no reference to the literature on the political economy of the 
welfare state from other disciplines, and the leading approach based on welfare 
regimes.50 
 
 In contrast, and in practice, ranging over health and social security, Iriart et al 
(2001, p. 1250) point to a new ideological common sense that is being used to 
reconstruct “fundamentals” from which to “rethink the system”. This comprises the 
following elements: 
• the crisis in health stems from financial causes; 
• management introduces a new and indispensable administrative rationality to 
resolve the crisis; 
• it is indispensable to subordinate clinical decisions to this new rationality if cost 
reduction is desired; 
• efficiency increases if financing is separated from service delivery, and if 
competition is generalized among all subsectors (state, social security, and 
private); 
• the market in health should be developed because it is the best regulator of quality 
and costs; 
• demand rather than supply should be subsidized; 
• making labor relationships flexible is the best mechanism to achieve efficiency, 
productivity, and quality; 
• private administration is more efficient and less corrupt than public 
administration; 
• payments for social security are each worker’s property; 
• deregulation of social security allows the user freedom of choice, to be able to opt 
for the best administrator of his or her funds; 
• the passage of the user/patient/beneficiary to client/consumer assures that rights 
are respected; 
• quality is assured by guaranteeing the client’s satisfaction. 
This ideology is being pushed by “experts”, especially in the context of critical 
economic performance, the conditionalities imposed by international agencies, and 
the privatization of health care provision smoothing the entry of multinational 
corporations into health and social security provision.  
Yet, as is readily apparent, this new common sense has no purchase 
whatsoever either on the specificity of health itself or on the particular problems faced 
by the poorest economies. Such considerations have been “taken out” and have been 
replaced by a “black box” of neo-liberal perspectives.  By contrast, health care needs 
to incorporate the following insights, and more:51 
• Health is highly dependent on socio-economic and socio-cultural determinants 
and not just a consequence of the direct provision of health services. 
• A distinction must be drawn between preventative, primary and curative services, 
recognising and addressing systemic tendencies for curative to be promoted at the 
expense of the others, especially where commercial imperatives arise. 
• Provision of health care itself ranges over diverse activities, from supply of 
buildings to training (and retention) of staff, and supply of drugs and equipment. 
• Different conditions arise and require response in different ways according to both 
medical and social circumstances. The “externalities” across health itself, and with 
other conditions affecting welfare, are widespread with considerable economies of 
scale and scope that need to be identified and accommodated in practice. 
• The practices, ethos or culture surrounding health are complex both for citizens 
and for health staff.  
 
As Katz (2004, p. 763) puts it in response to the Sachs Report, “Primary health care 
is, of course, one of the public services required to provide the conditions for good 
population health”. Yet, “We have 100 years of solid public health experience 
demonstrating that access to decent food, clean water, adequate sanitation, and shelter 
are the major determinants of health”, p. 756. Will social capital and/or the World 
Bank deliver on either? 
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Footnotes 
 
 
* This paper is not in its final version for various reasons and, if cited, this will 
hopefully be acknowledged.
 
1
 For Putnam’s McDonaldisation of de Tocqueville and more, see McLean et al (eds) (2002). 
2
 A phrase infamously deployed by Grootaert (1997), a leading social capital economist at the Bank. 
3
 References are to Deaton (2006) unless otherwise indicated. References to evaluators’ reports will 
give name and bracketed date but these are not listed in references. 
4
 This research will be the focus for a separate contribution.  
5
 In summary, “Managers of research at the Bank need to maintain checks and balances that preserve 
the credibility of its research. In particular, it needs to resist the temptation to make strong claims about 
preliminary and controversial research that appears to support policies that the Bank has historically 
supported”, p. 161. 
6
 Fine (2001), Fine et al (eds) (2001), Jomo and Fine (eds) (2006), and Bayliss and Fine (eds) (2007). 
7
 See also Fine (2007b) and below for social capital. 
8
 It is surely no accident that Deaton himself is one of the world’s leading econometricians as opposed 
to development economist (if the difference is allowed these days). 
9
 For freakonomics, see Levitt and Dubner (2006) and Fine and Milonakis (2008) for critique. 
10
 The Report itself opines, “we find it hard to imagine a group of evaluators who would be more 
distinguished or more qualified to evaluate the quality of development research”, p. 41. And, “Our 
evaluators represent the very best in contemporary research in development, and they did what the 
databases [of citations] cannot do, which is to read the work”, p. 45. 
11
 Note that the quotation continues, “A prime example of the second kind of failure [to provide 
intellectual public goods], research that is unlikely to be done by top academics is replication and 
testing … within academia replicating what someone has already done, although widely practiced, is 
not done systematically, and it is perceived as derivative and unoriginal, and not highly valued”, pp. 
 15/16. No evidence is offered for the later assertions, and they might be thought to be contradicted by 
mainstream economics itself, and certainly by social capital. 
12
 See also Caselli (2006, p. 12). 
13
 See also pp. 81/2. 
14
 See Wade (1996) on East Asian Miracle, and Fine et al (2001) and Jomo and Fine (eds) (2006) for 
shift from Washington to post Washington Consensus. More recently, on PRSPs, etc, see Fraser (2005) 
Tan (2007) and van Waeyenberge (2007). 
15
 It would be intriguing to know whether this piece was selected randomly for review or backfired as, 
“We also asked the Bank’s research director to nominate a group of ‘must read’ outstanding papers or 
books from DEC”, p. 41.  
16
 “Acemoglu also strongly criticized the work for its lack of an appropriate conceptual and empirical 
framework. As a result, the regression analyses in these studies cannot be used to support the 
conclusions that they ostensibly reach”, p. 64. 
17
 Quote taken by Galiani from Alatas et al (2002, p. 41). 
18
 Deaton and HIV/AIDS will be the subject of a separate contribution. 
19
 Interestingly Aye et al (2002) suggest that social capital both allows access to health services through 
collective support to meet user charges at times of financial stress but that this also further deteriorates 
health because of the obligation-related stress in being required to support others! 
20
 Note that “(health) system” appears eight times in this paragraph! The meaning of the last clause is 
unclear but may point to the need to examine the interaction of health systems with economic and 
social reproduction more generally. 
21
 Recently, a huge study by Gassner et al (2007) of private and public sector performance for 
electricity and water in developing and transitional economies concluded in favour of the private 
sector. Mischievously, I suggested in correspondence that failure to take account of subsidy to 
government provision might have biased results in favour of the public sector to which I received the 
following response, “The data we have does not allow us to make distinctions between sources of 
capital. In cases where the government would provide investment without this investment 
being recorded in the accounts of the utility, we will miss the spending, and underestimate investment - 
you are right”. Of course, exactly the same applies to donor support to the privatised or private sector. 
22
 Fine (2007a) in a plenary address to the Critical Management Studies Conference, inspired by the 
presence of originator of the McDonaldisation thesis, George Ritzer, as fellow plenary speaker.  
23
 See debate between Farr (2004 and 2007) and Fine (2007c) on the “history” of “social capital”, my 
position being there is none and, if there is, it is more one of social capital as the systemic properties of 
capitalism than of the contribution of non-economic relations to society. Note that Szreter and 
Woolcock (2004b, p. 1) boldly assert, in a sort of legitimising exercise, following Farr, that “Marx … 
was the first person to coin the phrase social capital”. This is not only totally wrong empirically but 
overlooks that Marx is using the term, as did others at the time and before, in a way totally at odds with 
its modern usage. More recent use of social capital in other ways that elevate the systemic and the 
economics of capitalism to the fore have also been overlooked by “histories” of the term. See Fine 
(2008b and 2009) for a fuller account. 
24
 The real neo-liberal origins of social capital, and Coleman’s use of it possibly to the point of 
plagiarism, are to be found with James Buchanan, the two sharing membership of the The Public 
Choice Society from its origins. Buchanan (1986, p.108) suggests, cited in Amadae (2003, p. 151) that:  
 
My diagnosis of American society is informed by the notion that we are living during a period 
of erosion of “social capital” that provides the basic framework for our culture, our economy, 
and our polity – a framework within which the “free society” in the classically liberal ideal 
perhaps came closest to realization in all of history. My efforts have been directed at trying to 
identify and to isolate the failures and breakdowns in institutions that are responsible for this 
erosion. 
 
This piece was, though, first published as Buchanan (1981) and must surely have been known to 
Coleman. 
25
 Note that the social capital literature has also begun to BBI Bourdieu, BBBI, and context, although 
these are inevitably reduced relative to the original, especially in Bourdieu’s emphasis upon the diverse 
social construction of the meaning of social capital from one application to another. 
26
 See Fine (2001) for fuller account, and also Fine (2003).  
 
 27
 See also Rao and Woolcock (2007). Note that they potentially misread the highly criticised report 
from Duflo (amongst a group of scholars, Sen and Douglas are judged to be senior without necessarily 
implying all others in the mix are unknown) and, for the topic of culture addressed by these scholars, 
she judges, “We are now in the presence of serious scholarship. The overall topic is relevant for the 
World Bank’s poverty reduction strategy. Still, this is a difficult subject, and I sometimes have the 
sense that the World Bank’s economists are stepping outside their comfort zone when they discuss it”, 
p. 6. This seems to go at least as far as the critique!  
28
 This leads to an unwittingly ironic appeal to critical discourse and institutional change as a rationale 
for their role within the Bank even though such an approach has always been used to criticise as well as 
to explain the Bank’s unacceptable postures. 
29
 Presumably, to his credit, Stiglitz seems to have borne no grudges for an apparent lack of overt 
support from the Bank’s social capitalists in his hours of need. The leading non-economist social 
capitalist, Michael Woolcock, is now Director of Research at the Brooks World Poverty Institute, 
University of Manchester, headed by Stiglitz. This is a nice bit of social capital but, on this and other 
casual evidence, suggests a potentially worrying and increasing fluidity between Bank and academic 
postings, further consolidating the agenda setting monopoly of the knowledge bank. 
30
 See Deaton (2003) for the idea that inequality of income is not in and of itself a determinant of health 
outcomes, although it is accepted that it may be correlated and attached to other important 
determinants. 
31
 The book is entitled Globalization and Health, indicative of a dualism between globalisation and 
social capital, the latter especially confined to the level of the community in health studies. See the 
Reader of Douglas et al (eds) (2007), for which social capital appears primarily within Part V, devoted 
to “Promoting Public Health at a Local Level”, with public health through public policy and impact of 
globalisation covered in the previous section. 
32
 Would you play cards with, invite to dinner, etc, someone with a gun? 
33
 Firearm ownership aside, Kunitz (2004, p. 70) observes of social capital, “the destruction of 
President Clinton’s plan for health care reform by a coalition of voluntary associations including the 
National Rifle Association, the Christian Coalition, the National Federation of Independent Businesses 
and the Health Insurance Association of America”. Muntaner (2004, p. 675) appropriately suggests that 
if social capital had been dubbed social anarchy in view of its potentially negative effects, (or social 
socialism because it is beneficial), it would have received short shrift even though, it should be added,  
reference could be made to negative social anarchy (or socialism). 
34
 Note for health, as with application of social capital in other fields, particular factors seem to exert 
strong influence, Scandinavia for case studies and authors and Social Science and Medicine as outlet, 
for example. 
35
 For other surveys, see Almedom (2005), Hawe and Shiell (2000), Szreter and Woolcock (2004), and 
Kawachi et al (2004) for example, and also www.socialcapitalgateway.org/NV-eng-health.htm  
36
 It is unfortunate but not necessary, for example, that Wilkinson, Kawachi and others should have 
jumped the social capital bandwagon.  
37
 As Forbes and Wainwright (2001, p. 811) observe, “as with most health inequalities research these 
theorists do not describe the philosophical approach of their work. However, from the implicit 
metaphysical and epistemology positions adopted, their approach can be largely located within the 
positivist tradition, which is about constructing ‘objective’ realities or prototypes based on observable 
phenomena”.  
38
 Apart from sadness, they also examine impact upon insomnia, anxiety and short temper. 
39
 Before attaching himself to it, Szreter was writing about SDH without the benefit of social capital. 
The term does not appear in Szreter and Mooney (1998) at all. Reminiscent of Putnam’s (1993) Italian 
study where social capital only appears at the end, the same is true of Szreter (1997), with first 
reference to it within his conclusion – the lag to appear in print for the former contribution may have 
been longer than for the latter. Note that Labonté and Schrecker (2007, p. 2) can interpret Szreter’s 
contributions as appealing for formation of effective political coalitions for health provision without 
reference to social capital. Subsequently, Szreter (2002a and b) jumps the social capital bandwagon and 
ties it to New Labour politics, but the substantive dependence of his analyses on social capital as such 
is limited.  By contrast, Woolcock has already abandoned social capital by the time his contributions 
are appearing with Szreter. It is far from clear how writing about social capital in the International 
Journal of Epidemiology brings about an influence upon the World Bank’s economists especially in 
view of the timing involved. Note also that Woolcock’s (1998) first appearance as a social capitalist is 
 
 in critical as much as synthetic vein. But this is before he is incorporated into the employ of the World 
Bank. 
40
 Smith and Lynch (2004, p. 691) note that whilst, in 1993, Putnam “explicitly states that health should 
not be considered an outcome of social capital”, seven years later “he had dramatically reversed his 
opinion”. Muntaner and Lynch (2002, p. 262) highlight Putnam’s ludicrous website claim that, “If you 
smoke and belong to no groups, it’s a toss up statistically whether you should stop smoking or start 
joining”. They tartly observe, “We are unaware of any study that has shown that the act of joining a 
group conferred the same health protective effect as not smoking”. 
41
 Putnam (2004, p. 667) also sees the social capital initiative as responding to “several decades of 
intellectual and political hegemony on the part of an individualistic philosophy that claimed that ‘there 
is no such thing as society’”. 
42
 Putnam (2004, p. 670) observes, “In short, I agree with Szreter and Woolcock that the state (or public 
policy) must be embraced in any understanding of how social capital influences well-being, including 
health, while being slightly bemused by the claim that this view is novel”. It is surely truly astonishing 
that there should be even a tame dispute over the significance of the state for health in the context of 
any variable, social capital or otherwise. 
43
 In one response in the debate, Szreter (2004a, p. 708) closes with the assertion that, “Thinking in 
terms of social capital explains what went so wrong in the 1830s and why the 1850s represented only 
an alleviation of those problems, not a solution, whereas the 1870s constitutes the birth of something 
very new – a practical programme engendered by a new configuration and imagination of the social 
and political relationship between classes composing a city – new forms of social capital”. This might 
be though to out-reduce class reductionism! 
44
 See also Navarro (2004b). 
45
 See also Bridgen (2006, p. 43) for a positive gloss on social capital, New Labour and health, “an 
opportunity, rather than a threat”, in closing – at least the alternatives are recognised! See also 
Muntaner et al (2001). 
46
 This too is reminiscent, of the contribution to the World Bank’s email discussion group on social 
capital, suggesting the social capital “calves are out of the barn and into green pastures and not likely to 
return soon. The term social capital is now firmly entrenched in the language of social scientists. Thus, 
for now and for some considerable time in the future, the term ‘social capital’, will be in common use 
amongst social scientists if not economists”. See Fine (2001, p. 241/2). 
47
 In an empirically flawed study, omitting levels of resourcing, etc, Coleman argued that Catholics did 
better at school for being better endowed with familial social capital. 
48
 And the World Bank’s social capital assessment tool, SOCAT, is still available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Assessment-Tool-
-SOCAT-/annex1.pdf 
49
 And it will come as no surprise that social capital is deemed to be important for addressing malaria, 
Mozumder and Marathe (2007) for example. 
50
 Esping-Andersen (1990 and 1999) and Fine (2002 and 2005) for critique. Gough (2000) seeks to 
apply the welfare regime approach to developing countries. 
51
 For this in the context of globalisation, see Labonté and Schrecker (2007a-c). For contrasting 
fortunes of the Colombian and Cuban health systems in the era of neo-liberalism, see de Groote et al 
(2005) and Vos (2005), respectively.  
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